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Let me state at the outset that I do not pretend to be an 
"expert" on China: my limited knowledge and understanding is 
based on reading, in the fields of anthropology and economics, 
and a short official visit to China in 1984. Not being a "China 
watcher", my own perspective is oriented to Chinese views of 
their own society. Furthermore, as an anthropologist I have a 
professional preference for looking at individual trees rather 
than at the wood as a whole, although I also believe that it is 
important to look at these trees in relation to the larger wood. 
The Chinese wood, though, is enormous.
The People's Republic of China is the third largest country in 
the world (after the USSR and Canada), feeding over one-fifth of 
the world's population (over one billion people) on slightly over 
7% of the world's arable land. China's population distribution is 
skewed around the 375 mm/15" isohyet, with eastern China 
supporting some 80% of the total population, while western China 
with its mountains and deserts is very sparsely populated but has 
natural resources important to development, notably oil, coal and 
other minerals. Only some 12% of China's people officially live 
in cities: 88% are "rural" dwellers ranging from full-time 
farmers, through seasonal commuters to temporary urban jobs, to 
regular commuters to permanent city workplaces.
China is also the world's oldest centra 
having been achieved within roughly 
during Europe's "dark ages". Her histor 
is one of technlogical innovation (the 
etc) ahead of the west. But China's 
recurrent revolts by the peasants again 
the class of the "gentry" and intelle 
technological and political advance 
beginnings of China's recorded history 
peasants have been "revolutionary" in 
that term. The tradition of peasant rev 
politicians necessarily regard as a sig
lised state, unification 
contemporary boundaries 
y during the middle ages 
compass, gunpowder, coal, 
history is also one of 
st their exploitation by 
ctuals which made these 
s possible. From the 
(three millenia ago), her 
the Copernican sense of 
olt is one that China's 
nificant policy factor.












recent history, from the nineteenth centry, is that of 
colonisation in and through the "treaty ports" on the 
seaboard and inland rivers, which were prised open after 
urn War of 1840-2 by the United Kingdom, France, Germany, 
the United States of America and Portugal. In these 
ports were est.ab' ished- within existing urban is-lands, 
trade and industry, surrounded by a vast sea of rural 
. This early colonisation was later supplanted, starting 
,. by Japanese imperialism which ebbed and flowed through
parts of China from its 
ia, and Qingdao being the
bases in the north (Dalian, 
most important) and in the
(
2offshore island of Taiwan. Notwithstanding Japanese support for 
the last Chinese imperial dynasty (the Qing), it was overthrown 
in the first revolution of 1911. The major Chinese struggle 
against Japanese domination began in 1931 and lasted until 
Japan's capitulation in August 1945. The anti-communist 
Guomindang was finally displaced by the second revolution, after 
two decades of internal struggle, in 1949, when the People's 
Republic of China was declared under the Chinese Communist Party 
(CCP). The Goumindang regime fled to and established itself on 
Taiwan, taking advantage, in nationalisation and land reform 
programmes, of the Japanese capitalisation of plantation 
agriculture and some industry on this island between 1895 and 
.1945.
The CCP administration's most immediate and urgent task in 1949 
was to stabilise the yuan and bring Weimar-type inflation and 
grain hoarding under control. Then it turned to land reform, 
involving both redistribution and registration of individual 
parcels. The peasant household did not long remain the basic unit 
of production, however. In 1952, the process of collectivisation 
began, moving from mutual aid to elementary to advanced 
co-operatives in four years, and then in 1958 on to "people's 
communes", sub-divided into production brigades and teams. Prior 
to 1955, co-operation in pooling tools, animals and land was 
voluntary, and it is in this period - whether due to voluntary 
co-operation, land redistribution or other factors, singly or in 
combination - that impressive gains in farm output were recorded. 
As collectivisation was speeded up in 195'6, coinciding with 
increases in the proportion of grain output statutorily procured 
from peasants, rural hunger became evident in villages like 
Kaixian'gong (Fei 1983:160-1), even prior to the first drive 
toward rural industrialisation during the "Great Leap Forward", 
which began in 1958.
The establishment of the communes coincided with poor weather 
during the "Great Leap Forward" (1.958-61), during which time Mao 
attempted to push rural industrialisation on an inadequate 
technological base and to some extent at the expense of peasant 
agriculture and consumption. It is estimated that some 15-20 
million "surplus deaths" occurred from lack of food during this 
' period. From 1959 to 1962, the rate of net natural population 
increase hovered at around five per thousand, down from well over 
20 per thousand in the years preceding and succeeding the Great 
Leap (Tian Xueyuan 1981:37). The Great.Leap was succeeded by five 
years of more, conservative policy designed to rehabilitate 
agriculture, but this swing of the Chinese political pendulum was 
reversed again between 1966-76, • during the "Great Proletarian 
Cultural Revolution", against which all of current policy may be 
glossed as a reaction.
Yet Mao's basic policy of "walking on two legs" (ie. those of, 
.agriculture and industry) continues to inform current policy. 
Today this policy has been combined, not with Mao's inward
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looking "self-reliance", but with "opening to the west" to take 
advantage of recent technological advances while retaining a 
basically socialist (ie. centrally co-ordinated) economy in which 
public ownership ("ownership by the whole people") remains 
dominant even while collective and increasingly private ownership 
(eg. in the transport and other service sectors) continue to 
expand. The pricing mechanism has become a very important policy 
tool in restructuring the Chinese economy and modes of 
management, but socialist indices- (notably the rate of 
"accumulation" or reinvestment, and the balance between 
investment ratios in heavy and light industry) are still regarded 
as critically important in national economic planning. The 
"privatisation" of cultural education (music, art, sport), 
medicine and other professions is today legitimised by the 
additional services so provided, in the context of their overall 
scarcity in Chinese society.
China has in fact reached a developmental plateau as a result of 
Maoist policies. The majority of China's citizens are now 
clothed, fed and sheltered such that the average life span has 
been extended to comparability with developed countries. But 
something more than economic redistribution and preventive health 
programmes is now needed, if China is to surpass its earlier 
achievements and not stagnate on this plateau of equally 
distributed relative poverty, low educational levels, and in 
international terms obsolete technology.
3. CONTEMPORARY'POLITICAL ECONOMY
Today the class divisions of Old China (gentry, literati, 
landlords, rich, middle and poor peasants) no longer characterise 
New China, but the rural-urban divide remains significant in many 
ways. Per capita income in 1984, for example, averaged Y355 among 
the peasantry (1), whereas per capita expenditure in the cities 
averaged Y608 (2). China has certainly managed to raise rural 
incomes and improve rural access to services. However, the 
rural-urban gap, in both income and expenditure, has also been 
maintained at a ratio of roughly 1:2.
There is also a significant gap in earnings between state 
employees and workers in "collectively-owned enterprises". In 
1980, this ratio was Y803: Y624 (Yu 1984:603). This gap may be 
related to the different costs involved in establishing such 
differentially-capitalised enterprises: to create one job in the 
state-owned sector costs up to 5 times more than in collectively- 
owned enterprises (Yu 1984:582). However, levels of living are 
generally'low for'everyone, as a result of state appropriations 
based on low wages, which some Chinese regard as exploitation of 
workers. In this context, it is hardly surprising that the State 
Council (China's equivalent of Zimbabwe's Cabinet and Public 
Service Commission combined) has recently ruled out further wage 
increases without corresponding increases in productivity (Zhao
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Ziyang 1985). Nonetheless, certain functionaries of both state 
and "collectively-owned" enterprises have regular access to cars, 
luxury foods and increased living space as part of their "work". 
The life-style of this very small minority is notably different 
to that of "ordinary people", including intellectuals as well as 
workers.
However, in the countryside, among a significant minority of 
peasants, the post-1978 agricultural reforms have created a range 
of "peasant" wealth inconceivable during the Maoist years, and 
well in excess of average urban incomes. Although- the average 
peasant income remains half that of the average city dweller, 
given that peasants outnumber urbanites 8:1, in absolute terms, 
there must be many more peasants than town dwellers who have 
incomes above the national average.
The agricultural reforms based on the peasant's own labour 
capacity were actually started in the poorest rural areas which 
had virtually nothing to lose by experimentation, such as 
Fengyang county, Anhui province, where before 1980 peasants 
without food in 'winter begged in towns and cities as far afield 
as Nanjing, 100 kms distant (see also Myrdal 1984:4,4-56). Such 
peasants having shown that "development" is possible under 
altered policy conditions, that they themselves were not 
personally responsible for their poverty through idleness or 
similar, special efforts are now made by most local authorities 
to assist those whose physical or mental disability does make it 
difficult for them to earn wealth through their own labour.
4. RURAL DEVELOPMENT POLICIES AND EXPERIENCE: AGRICULTURE
Central policy toward the Chinese peasantry and countryside has 
explicitly turned back to the early 1950s in order to consolidate 
and expand further agricultural development, and has reinstated 
the peasant household as the basic unit of rural production. Four 
of every five communes have already been stripped of all their 
non-economic responsibilities (administrative, military, medical, 
educational). Where they survive, these modified communes have 
become purely economic enterprises in the collective ownership 
mode, concerned with agricultural infrastructure (irrigation, 
.flood control, water development) and agricultural processing, as 
well as with rural industries, including energy.(3) Many more 
production brigades than communes survive as economic 
enterprises, and they have often been reconstituted as 
"co-operatives". Although agricultural production has been 
devolved to the level of individual households, collective and 
co-operative control'of the agricultural inrrastructure, energy 
and manufacturing has been retained, I think, primarily because 
of the difficulty of disaggregating the industrial investments 
made by the collectives prior to 1976, to the level of household 
management. Rural industrialisation requires larger units of 
control and investment than households, at least in the situation
5where households do not have the necessary financial resources 
for such investment: but even that is changing now in rural 
China.
The change in agricultural policy occurred because collectivised 
production did not deliver the output levels required for food 
self-sufficiency: see table 1. Prior to 1978, China barely 
managed to achieve an output level of 300kgs of grain per head of 
population (Lardy 1983:149, table 4.2), the level at which, grain 
is voluntarily marketed by peasants after their retentions for 
personal consumption. Grain procurements, including agricultural 
taxes, have varied up to. 45% of total output (Lardy 1983:34, 
table 2.1), but the "commodity grain index" has only very 
recently surpassed 50% (meaning that half of all the grain 
produced is sold). To illustrate the impact of these figures, I 
shall take one specific example. In Kaixian'gong village, in the 
triple-cropping "heartland" province of Jiangsu, grain 
procurement peaked at 40% in the late 1950s, when virtually a 
generation disappeared from this village as a consequence ■(see 
table 2 ) .
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Sources: China Today (1985:210, table II); Zhao Ziyang (1985).
Table 2. Selected indicators: Kaixian'gong in different years.
indicator 1936 1956/7 1981 1984*
total population ■ 1 458 1 440 1 761 2 372
total households 360 600 432 572
average household size 4.05 2.40 4.08 4.15
sex ratio (M:F 1:) 0.84
dependency ratio
1 worker: dependants) 0.62 0.52 0.95 0.77
total grain output (jin]) 900 000 1 983 000 2 398 000 3 840 000
grain output per mu pa 3-400 560 1 000 . 1 431
external appropriations of
grain as % of total output 25 40 . 35 33
Note: * these figures incorporate three production teams added to 
the village in the 1970s after the village boundaries were 
altered, which have been excluded from the 1981 figures. Sources: 
Fei (1983); Geddes (1963); field notes (1984).
even though grainlandHowever, by 1984, had been converted to
6other crops and notwithstanding transport and storage problems, 
national grain output averaged nearly 400 kgs per head(4) and 
consumption averaged 230kgs per head(5). These achievements are 
generally attributed to the price increases and more flexible 
. marketing practices associated with the agricultural reforms.
While output remained well below demand, the Chinese state used a 
system of compulsory delivery quotas for grain and all . other 
foodstuffs, from all communes, at- fixed prices, in order to 
procure food for urban consumption. The grain was sold at 
procurement prices, with the state absorbing in subsidies the 
costs of transport and distribution. Rationing restricted urban 
demand.
Recently, from 1983, food has become sufficiently available to 
permit the rationing system to be dismantled in stages, and China 
has abandoned its former compulsory quota deliveries to the state 
in favour of the ■ "contract system". Previously, in the
collectivised system, the production team held the smallest unit 
of the state quota for each agricultural product. From 1979 to 
1983, therefore, as in the early 1960s (Eckstein 1977:81), the 
teams entered into contracts with their constituent households to 
deliver "contracted" sub-divisions of the quota, with a financial 
penalty (to buy in the deficit from elsewhere) for short 
delivery. The contract system is now established all over China, 
but since teams no longer exist as such (they are often 
co-operatives, but sometimes defunct except for dispute
settlement), contracts are signed between households and local 
' administrative units, usually townships. All produce in excess of 
the contract is controlled by the producing household and sold 
into the free markets if not consumed. The proceeds and profits 
of such surplus are retained by the household, which is now taxed 
in new ways. The most efficient rural households earn enormous 
incomes, of Y50,000 or more annually; and the "tail-enders", whom 
rural administrations make special efforts to assist, are less 
poor than they used to be. Commodity circulation in the 
countryside has increased markedly, reflecting this greater 
wealth.
However, the contract system, in its effort to increase the 
efficiency of labour, has not only created vast rural income 
differentials (even while allowing many peasants to become richer 
than urbanites), but has also abandoned the concept of equal 
access to the means of agricultural production. "Specialised" 
households contract for acreages much in excess of ordinary 
households, and have also begun to hire labour, on. conditions 
carefully policed by the state. As prices for agricultural 
commoditi-es- have-been increased to encourage farm output, state 
and municipal, subsidies have been diverted to urban consumers to 
shield them against the inflationary erosion of their wages and 
salaries (which are still set within the framework of the 9-grade 
state system and, even with increased bonuses, in 1984 worked out 
at a maximum of less than Y200 per month: contra Eckstein 1977).
7The restructuring of China's economy as "market socialist" is a 
massive exercise in understanding and balancing functional 
interrelationships in the total economy: it is not a simple 
switch to "capitalism”.
5. RURAL DEVELOPMENT POLICIES AND EXPERIENCE: INDUSTRIALISATION
China has long suffered from a labour surplus. During the period 
of collectivised agriculture, this surplus was absorbed in 
infrastructural projects based on manual labour, especially 
transport (roads) and water development (irrigation, flood 
control). "Walking on two legs" has therefore long been seen as 
desirable, but the first experience of rural industrialisation, 
during the Great Leap Forward, was a disastrous experience, 
wasteful and grossly inefficient, and ecologically damaging (as 
has been most of-China's post-1949 growth). This legacy continued 
after the Great Leap in the small-scale, local fertiliser plants 
and foundries, the majority of which have been closed and/or 
rationalised since 1979, for reasons which relate primarily to 
China's need to use her available energy as efficiently as 
possible.
The second strand of industrial experimentation in China's 
countryside began in the early 1970s, as urban collectively-owned 
enterprises sub-contracted ("put out") simple aspects of their 
manufacturing process (eg. of bicycles) to peri-urban communes 
with surplus labour, and helped these communes to acquire the 
necessary equipment and machinery to make these parts. This link 
between urban and rural manufacturing has expanded considerably 
in recent years,'and has permitted the development of daily 
commuting by residents of rural villages to factory work in their 
neighbourhood•
The third facet of rural industrialisation has been the 
independent development of manufacturing, by townships and even 
villages much more remote from major centres. Often (for example, 
in Kaixian'gong), the strategy behind such rural 
industrialisation proper has been an attempt to achieve vertical 
integration off the existing productive base in agriculture (in 
this case, silk). However, so far this strategy has not been as 
successful as in theory it should be, because the most obvious 
area for the development of manufacturing, notably textiles, and 
in particular silk and cotton weaving, comprises a state 
manufacturing monopoly and the state has therefore not permitted 
the intended integration to occur. So Kaixian'gong, which has 
produced and spun silk since the 1930s, is permitted to weave 
only synthetics, the raw material.s for which are imported from as 
far afield as Japan!
As the previous paragraph suggests, there are various constraints 
on rural industrialisation in China. Here I shall discuss only 
two important constraints at each, of the central and .local- 
levels .
8.
Central policy, especially fiscal, affects access to investment 
funds, and very recently, in an attempt to dampen demand, the 
Bank of China has raised interest rates, specifically for this 
type of investment, as well as more generally.
The second major central constraint pertains to energy, on which 
all industrialisation is crucially dependent. China has an energy 
deficit, particularly in its countryside. Electricity comprises 
only 13.64% of- rural China's productive use of power, 
notwithstanding its emphasis on small hydro-electric stations. In 
1983 these small rural stations had a total generating capacity 
of roughly 2 400 megawatts (a little under twice Kariba's total 
capacity), or 42% of all rural electricity consumed. Coal 
generates more than three-quarters of all power used in rural 
production, and oil the remaining 11 per cent. Turning from 
productive to domestic use, although China pioneered the biogas 
technology, 3.76 million biogas plants provide only 0.23% of all 
domestic power used in rural China, while straw (grain stalks), 
firewood and animal manure provide 99.63% of domestic energy 
needs (Deng Keyun 1985). Rural factories, like those in 
Kaixian'gong, which, having no energy sources of their own save a 
back-up diesel generator, draw their power from the national 
grid, are frequently and without warning switched out when urban 
demand peaks or overloads the grid, thus increasing their 
production costs as well as endangering both their quality of and 
delivery dates for output.
The most important local constraints' on rural industrialisation 
include, firstly, the lack of technical and managerial skills, 
although marketing skills are now developing very rapidly (helped 
not only by increasing practice as plants have taken 
responsibility for marketing their output surplus to stat^ 
quotas, but also, in peri-urban situations, by links to urban 
enterprises).
Secondly, although overmanning is problematic for the efficiency 
of rural industries, industry is used to absorb underemployed 
agricultural workers. Overmanning is then used to raise rural 
incomes by employing unnecessary workers at urban wage levels, 
thus retaining a greater proportion of the value produced among 
its rural producers, rather than turning it over to the state 
through various mechanisms of appropriation. There has been a 
massive switch of labour from farming to industry in the past 
seven years. Fei (1985:20) notes that one-third of the labour 
force which is classified as "rural" in southern Jiangsu 
province, has 1 efir farmrrrg for industrial employment in villages, 
or to commute to- small towns. In just three years, between 1981 
and 1984 , in Kaixian'gong, the proportion of the labour force 
employed full-time in industrial and "sideline" enterprises 
nearly doubled, from 23% to 42% (Fei 1983:218; field notes, 
1984).
f
9The'problem of excess rural workers is a particularly intractable 
one, which is reflected in^thelpersistence of labour migration in 
the People's Republic* of "China,' notwithstanding the controls on 
— rural-urban mobility which' used rto operate in the past. These 
controls included the rural exit.^and urban entry permits from the 
employing enterprises, party branches, and security bureaux; 
together with the urban food and clothing ration cards. More 
recently these controls have been relaxed or removed, as the new 
marketing system has required much greater mobility. Most often 
labour migration is organised not on an individual but on a team 
basis,-mainly for construction work -n r^ad^ an"1 buildings 
especially in the underdeveloped (western) areas. Workers are 
shipped out by the local—  administrative authority (township, 
autonomous state, county) as a contract team for a specific time 
period, usually one year. For example, in 1984, when I visited 
Zhou village, in Dali Autonomous State (Yunnan Province), it had 
800 workers in a constructionJteam sent out on annual contracts 
(see also Fei 1985). The tearn's total wages are generally 
remitted back to the "shipping"- authority. During the period of 
collectivisation, the individual members (or their families) drew 
only the equivalent of— their- locally-defined work points, 
irrespective of the contract price. Today the team controls its 
own earnings, and may distribute any surplus arising from early 
completion or cost effectiveness, rather than turning it over to 
the local authority. This form of labour migration may 
substitute for industrial employment as a means of absorbing 
underemployed rural labour.
6. PROBLEMS OF RURAL DEVELOPMENT IN CHINA
From what I have said above, it should be clear that many 
components of the rural development "problematic" are as visible 
in China as in any other third-world country, while ecological 
damage and environmental pollution are arguably worse. The past 
emphasis on grain production (which, as Eckstein (1977:207, 230)
notes, put 80% of the total sown area to grain and some 70% of 
the labour force to producing 20% of the GDP), has had serious 
ecological effects, especially in those mountainous regions 
unsuited to grain production. Although one can argue that, in the 
short run at least, people should take priority over the 
environment, such policies lead to ecological degradation which, 
in the longer term, both endangers the very base of production 
and constitutes an ongoing threat to health. For example, 80% of 
Chinese cities have- no sewage treatment plants; respiratory 
diseases exacerbated b^ aerial smog are rife, especially in 
winter; clean drinking water is increasingly scarce as rivers 
-receive-not only—human_but also—industrial eff-luent; cancer has 
become the second major cause of death. China's industrialisation 
to date has been purchased at the expense of her environment, and 
she is now having to face these problems and pick up the 
ecological and health bills for past policies, in both city and 
countryside.
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Against this background, among many problematic isues of Chinese 
rural development, in my opinion three will be particularly 
critical in the years - ahead.”.- -These are three sets of
contradictions: between”_technological modernisation and
■employment; between patriliny and demographic policy; and between 
women's productive^ roles- and their -position in tne family 
structure. All three of these contradictions feed into the 
problem, of achieving further growth without sacrificing too much 
equity in the world's most populous nation, which is becoming 
increasingly 'consumption-oriented. Is socialist consumerism 
self-contradictory?“Or does contemporary China - in which today's 
"truth" is tomorrow's' historical relic - indicate a new viability 
for "socialism with. (cultural-), characteristics" that are not tied 
to self-abnegation? '
(a) the contradiction between technological modernisation and
employment is a variant of ^ the~old problem of capital versus 
labour-intensity. With the” "basic needs" of her population 
largely .met, and in the context, • of the rural underemployment 
detailed earlier, China's problem for the productive future 
mismatches the requirements of an increasingly "high" technology 
against a vast population oir poorly educated and largely
unskilled workers, both rural and urban. Rising unemployment is 
being countered at present by the increasing privatisation of 
employment in_ services; and by a demographic policy which in 
normal circumstanceszzpermit-s each family only one child. Even 
with -full state controls of both employment and social
reproduction, the question of ideology must arise in this sector, 
for it is even more difficult to "put politics in control" of the 
technology of the 1980s (eg. computerisation, nuclear medicine) 
than it was in the 1950s.
(b) There is a very basic antipathy between Chinese patriliny and
current demographic policy. Since 1979 the "one child family" 
policy has been strictly enforced among the Han (who comprise 
over 93% of the total population). As yet, however, the 55 
"minorities" have only been "encouraged" to limit their families 
through positive sanctions. There are financial and other
inducements to sign the one-child contract, which in the past 
included additional food rations, and today guarantee entry to 
"good" schools and preference in new housing lists. Secondly, 
negative sanctions penalise those who do not sign the
reproductive contract with the state. If a second child is born,
the extra allowances paids must be repaid from the time of 
receipt. A third child automatically entails the loss of an urban 
job and banishment to the countryside. More recently, surplus 
pregnancy has entailed enforced abortion. But China, especially 
rural China, remains strongly patrilineal, even if its
■“patriarchal tendencies'nave been curbed by the state, and the 
cultural preference for male heirs has led to the 
readily-acknowledged problem of an increase in female
infanticide. Female infanticide was part of Old China, as 
demographic statistics clearly reveal (see table 2), but after
11
the 1949 revolution, encouraged by propaganda campaigns against 
it, the practice declined. After 1979, the state has had to wage 
war against its resumption, as the new demographic policy has 
brought to a head the confrontation between the state ideology 
of female equality and the rural reality of the traditional 
social structure and its own ideology.
(c) Contemporary demographic policy also feeds into the broader 
•problem of women's productive roles in the national economy and 
society, on the one hand, and their productive and consumer roles 
in household and family structures on the other. Although an 
attempt was made during the Great Leap Forward to collectivise 
consumption in team and even brigaue Ccmtt:ena, iL wa= quickly 
a^anuoncd aa inefficient in releasing labour for freluwoik and 
wasteful of limited food resources. So even while production w a s /  
collectivised, the household remained the unit of consumption in 
China. The traditional contradictions between women as 
reproducers providing domestic services, and women as producers, 
have thus been reproduced in a socialist economy (Croll 1979, 
1984). Permitting women to remain tied into traditional 
subservience within family structures is reciprocally part of the 
demographic problem, but perhaps more importantly is also the 
major obstacle to realising their social liberation in accordance 
with their long-standing legal equality in New China.
Finally, then, one might end this limited and selective review 
not merely by noting the similarities between China and other 
developing economies, but more pointedly by noting that China 
herself is today apparently more conscious of such similarities 
than she has professed to be in the past. Today, therefore, 
China s rulers profess the relevance to themselves of the 
experiences of other countries, particularly in the fields 'of 
technology and economics. What the Chinese themselves see as 
learning to manipulate their economy in time-tested ways to 
achieve the ends of social policy, outsiders often dismiss as 
selling out to the forces of international capital. In any 
serious attempt to understand Chinese reality, I . suspect that 
this view is unprofitable in all senses of that term.
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